The rising trend of shifting borders: Securitisation and externalisation of EU migration control in the Western Balkans

By Orestis Nicolaou | OMC 2025

Photo by Alexey Demidov on Unsplash

Europe’s evolving border regime

For over three decades, the European Union (EU) has undergone a profound transformation in how it conceptualises and enforces its borders. Internally, it has embraced fluidity through the Schengen Area since the 90s, promoting freedom of movement as a core principle of European integration. Externally, however - in the post 9/11 period - the EU has securitised and extended its borders beyond its territorial limits, promoting a border regime in which neighbouring third countries (both EU candidates and not) increasingly function as de facto border guards and the first line of migration control. This deterrence-based framework is enacted through a broader phenomenon known as “shifting borders”: borders that appear, disappear, or are displaced according to political priorities and the identity of those who approach them. The Western Balkans (WB) are now central to this process, operating both as future EU candidates and as active enforcers of EU migration policy.

From transit corridor to buffer zone

The Western Balkans route gained prominence after 2012, following the EU’s decision to relax visa regimes for countries of the WB. By 2015, in the wake of Merkel’s ‘Wir schaffen das (‘we can do this’) declaration, the path through WB became a primary transit corridor for refugees and migrants fleeing conflict zones. While it initially facilitated humanitarian passage, the route was declared “closed” with the 2016 EU-Turkey Statement. In exchange for billions of euros and political concessions, Türkiye agreed to host refugees and prevent crossings into Greece. At the same time, cross-border violence increased significantly as a domino effect across the countries forming the Balkan corridor, and (im)mobility became the prevailing condition for people on the move in the Balkans. 

A new phase of externalisation

This situation is set to deepen under the EU’s  New Pact on Migration and Asylum, introduced in 2020, adopted in 2024, and expected to be fully implemented by 2026. Promoted as a solution to the EU’s fragmented asylum system, the Pact consists of ten legislative measures grouped into five pillars: Screening, Eurodac, Asylum Procedures, Migration Management, and Crisis Response. While framed as a mechanism for ‘solidarity and responsibility sharing’ promising a ‘fresh start’, the Pact prioritises control with fast-tracking procedures, tightening returns, and expanding surveillance, rather than investing in protection or long-term integration.

Essentially, the Pact exclusively addresses asylum seekers, ignoring regular migrants and integration pathways. This becomes evident when looking at the figures: in 2023 alone, the EU granted over 3.7 million first residence permits to non-EU nationals, while 1.14 million people applied for asylum, a relatively high number, yet still not even half of the EU’s labour needs for that year. Despite the vital contributions of migrant workers to the EU economy, the Pact includes no provisions for their integration. Instead, it reflects the political victory of securitised narratives and rising populism, where migration is framed as a threat to be managed and a problem which requires a solution rather than a human reality to be planned for.

At the centre of the Pact lies externalisation. Externalisation is a multi-dimensional process through which functions traditionally carried out by a state within its own borders are instead performed, partially or entirely, beyond its territorial boundaries. Through agreements with countries in North Africa and the Middle East, the EU and its member states fund migration control measures in states with questionable human rights records, which are subsequently designated as “safe third countries” and carry out forced returns of persons on the move. This practice, which flirts with violating the principle of non-refoulement, is institutionalised as acceptable within the framework of the new Pact. Countries in this position have leveraged their role as “gatekeepers” to request additional support. The EU’s governance crisis and political panic driven by the perception of migration as a security threat, strengthens these regimes geopolitically, while also enabling the EU to control its borders from a distance (or at least gives the impression). For the WB, however, the dynamic is different. These countries lack the bargaining power of Tunisia or Türkiye. Instead, their alignment with EU border policy is shaped by their desire for membership. Migration and border control have become the backbone of their relationship with the EU. The region is no longer seen as a corridor, but as a buffer zone space where the EU’s rules are applied and tested without the rights and protections that accompany membership. Beyond shifting border control to third countries, the notion of externalisation now increasingly drives outsourcing of core aspects of asylum processing itself, illustrated by the Italy-Albania agreement and Germany’s recent interest in similar arrangements in the Western Balkans.

The expanding reach of EU migration control

Frontex, the EU’s border and coast guard agency, is central to this strategy of externalisation. Originally a coordinating body, it now operates actively in several non-EU countries, including across WB, through bilateral status agreements and operational action plans. These deployments reflect the EU’s effort to shift migration control beyond its formal borders. Frontex’s mandate encompasses surveillance, biometric data collection, risk analysis, and return operations, effectively extending EU migration governance into third countries. The agency also facilitates the use of advanced surveillance technologies (drones, thermal cameras, and interoperable biometric systems such as the so-called “Balkandac”) that enable the monitoring, tracking, and at times criminalisation of people on the move. However, Frontex has faced mounting criticism and scrutiny over its role in illegal pushbacks and rights violations. Although the EU frames these measures as necessary to combat smuggling and irregular migration, this approach ignores a central reality: smuggling networks flourish because safe and legal pathways remain scarce or inaccessible. By fortifying its borders, Europe sustains the very smuggling economy it seeks to dismantle.

Conclusion

The New Pact does not simply continue the EU’s externalisation agenda; it intensifies it, not only by shifting border control outward, but by deepening the outsourcing of asylum processing and surveillance. These practices raise serious legal and ethical concerns, particularly regarding asylum seekers’ rights and the erosion of the EU’s own protection framework. Frontex plays a central role in this strategy, yet the question is not whether Frontex is good or evil, but whether it can be made better: more transparent, accountable, and rights-compliant. A humane and sustainable response to migration requires moving beyond deterrence-driven strategies and investing in accessible legal pathways, robust integration policies, and genuine international solidarity. Only then can the EU begin to align its migration policies with its founding values of human rights and human dignity. ​

Orestis Nicolaou 

Orestis is a researcher in migration and human rights. He holds two Master’s degrees and was awarded for his research on EU migration policies and the affections on the Western Balkans.