When helping migrants becomes a crime

By Leonard Nalbantis 

Photo by Ayşegül Aytören on Pexels

Can saving someone's life make you a criminal?

In January 2026, a court on the Greek island Lesvos finally cleared 24 humanitarian workers of criminal charges after they had spent more than seven years fighting their case. They were accused of forming a criminal organisation that facilitated the irregular entry of migrants. As the presiding judge ultimately put it, “waiting to rescue a human life cannot be considered facilitation of illegal entry”. 

Criminalisation of humanitarian aid happens not only in the courtrooms. A recent example is the amendment to the Greek Migration Act in 2026. It established significantly harsher penalties for members of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) who facilitated entry and exit of third-country nationals, and provided them with accommodation or transport. These offences are now punishable by significantly longer prison sentences and higher fines in Greece.

Across Europe, humanitarian workers are increasingly finding themselves investigated and convicted for helping migrants.

Can Europe protect those who help migrants?

On paper, many European Union (EU) Member States now include clauses in their criminal law to allow punishment to be waived if the person has acted on humanitarian grounds. For example, Greek law protects captains, pilots and drivers from criminal liability when they rescue people at sea or transport people in need of international protection.

Many highest courts have also gone beyond the individual case. For example, in June 2025, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) held that it is not a criminal offence for a person to help minors enter the EU and apply for asylum. In its reasoning, it stated that unauthorised entry must not conflict with the fundamental rights enshrined in the EU Charter. Although the CJEU did not recognise a general right to provide humanitarian assistance, it did do so in cases involving family life and the rights of children.

The judgment of the French Conseil constitutionnel (CC) of 6 July 2018 provides an even more promising pathway towards recognising legal protection for humanitarian workers assisting migrants. In this case, a farmer had been convicted for providing accommodation to migrants and helping them on his farm. When the case came before the CC, the court based its ruling on the constitutional principle of fraternité: the idea that people have an individual right to help one another.

The CC’s decision marked an important occasion in strengthening the legal protection of humanitarian aid. It showed that the principle of fraternité is capable of providing a legal basis for protecting people who help migrants in need. Even though this legal principle is only applicable to those on the French territory and the French constitution, its principle demonstrates a fundamental idea of solidarity. That everyone has a subjective right to be able to help others in situations of distress. 

Solidarity and its emancipatory potential

Solidarity is essentially about protecting human life. For those affected by the border regime, it challenges the view that helping migrants should be treated as a crime. When volunteers rescue people at sea or provide basic assistance to those in vulnerable situations, they are acting to protect rights that should apply to everyone.

The French case has demonstrated how the constitutional principle of solidarity (fraternité) can allow for de-criminalisation of humanitarian aid. It has shown that state authority can be restricted in order to protect fundamental human rights (fraternité). If solidarity can be asserted not only as a moral obligation but as an enforceable subjective right afforded to humanitarian workers subjected to criminalisation, it might be able to bring about a fair change. 

Other countries may draw on comparable principles in their own legal systems to uphold humanitarian assistance and challenge its criminalisation. 

Mobilising solidarity through legal struggles

This article offers both hope and caution.

It is hopeful that courts have, in some cases, recognised humanitarian motives over criminalisation. Yet, protections remain limited across Europe; many people who assist migrants continue to face investigations and prosecutions.

Legal struggles must be fought first before acts of solidarity can be effectively reinforced. Non-state actors across civil society must challenge state-centred interpretations of the law; alongside NGOs, lawyers and others conducting before courts, legal scholarship must identify the precedents for a right to solidarity in domestic constitutions and international law. Only then can the emancipatory potential of solidarity contribute to the decriminalisation of humanitarian activities. 

Leonard Nalbantis

Leonard studied law at the Universities of Cologne and Mainz and holds an LL.M. in International Law and Security from the University of Glasgow. He is a research assistant at the Chair of Public Law held by Professor David Roth-Isigkeit at the German University of Administrative Sciences Speyer. His research interests include constitutional law, particularly the protection of fundamental rights, as well as public international law and migration law. He also serves as a reporter for International Law in Domestic Courts (Oxford University Press) and has provided pro bono legal advice on asylum and immigration law. You can find him on LinkedIn.